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Abstract 
In  a  two-stage  game,  we  study  under  what  conditions  banks  offer  phonebanking  (first 
stage).  In  the  second  stage,  they  are  competitors  in  the  market  for  deposits.  Offering  the 
phone option  creates two opposing  effects. The first is a demand  effect as depositors  strictly 
prefer to manage  some of their financial  transactions  by phone.  The  second  (strategic)  effect 
is  that  competition  is  increased  as  transaction  costs  are  lowered.  Universal  phonebanking 
prevails  when  the  demand  effect  dominates  the  strategic  effect.  Specialization  can  occur  in 
that  one  bank  offers  the  phone  option  while  the  other  does  not. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological  innovation  over  the  past  decade  redesigned  the  art  of  competition 
in  banking.  Recently,  the  innovation  ‘phonebanking’  appeared  as  a  “banking 
facility  which  can  be  accessed  remotely  by  a  customer  via  his  or  her  telephone” 
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advice.  Harry  Webers  provided  useful  comments.  We  also  benefited  from  comments  made  by  Bernard 
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(Essinger,  1992,  p.  152).  Phonebanking  facilities  include,  for  example,  statement 
and  check  book  ordering,  third  party  payments  and  up to date  account  information.  ’ 
The  number  of  banks  offering  this  kind  of  access  has  increased  substantially 
during  the  recent  past.  In  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Sweden,  virtually  all  major  banks  offer  phonebanking.  The  percentage  of  these 
banks’  depositors  using  this  innovation  ranges  from  2  to  1.5 for  Belgium,  3  to  50 
for  France  and  3  to  100  for  the  United  Kingdom.  ’ 
In  our  model,  depositors  value  a  phonebank  since  it  facilitates  access  to  their 
account.  Using  the  phone  option  reduces  their  transaction  costs  to  manage  their 
account.  For  example,  it may  lower  their  travelling  costs.  Therefore,  depositors  are 
willing  to  accept  lower  deposit  rates  in  order  to  become  clients  at  a phonebank.  3 
The  paper  considers  a  spatial  duopoly.  It  analyzes  whether  banks  will  offer 
phonebanking  to  their  clients  or  not  and  what  the  effects  upon  their  market  shares, 
deposit  rates,  and  profits  will  be.  A  deposit  market  with  related  financial  services 
is  modelled  as  a  two-stage  game.  In  the  first  stage,  banks  decide  whether  to 
introduce  the  phone  option  or  not.  In  the  second  stage,  banks  compete  in  deposit 
rates.  We  apply  a model  related  to the  Salop  (1979)  circle  model.  At  a phonebank, 
depositors  can  exercise  some  financial  transactions  by  phone.  Using  the  phone 
option  has  the  same  cost  for  every  depositor.  Graphically,  the  phone  option  can  be 
modelled  as  the  center  of  a  circle:  the  distance  from  the  center  is  the  same  for 
every  point  on  the  circle.  4 Each  depositor,  being  a client  at  a phonebank,  has  the 
opportunity  to  exercise  some  of  his  or  her  transactions  at  a fixed  cost.  5 
Offering  the  phone  option  has  two  opposite  effects.  First,  it  makes  the  bank 
offering  that  option  more  attractive  to  depositors  (demand  effect).  Second,  it 
encourages  competition  among  banks  as  it  implies  lower  transaction  costs  (stra- 
tegic  effect).  Banks  do  not  offer  the  phone  option  (no  phonebanking)  if  the 
strategic  effect  dominates.  Only  one  bank  offering  the  phone  option  (speciafizu- 
tion)  requires  a relatively  large  demand  effect  and  a moderate  strategic  effect.  Two 
phonebanks  (unioersai  phonebanking)  appear  if the  demand  effect  overwhelms  the 
strategic  effect.  Since  universal  phonebanking  implies  lower  transaction  costs,  it 
leads  to  tougher  competition  than  no  phonebanking. 
’ A  formally  equivaient  idea  has  already  been  in  existence  for  some  time:  depositors  use  envelopes 
to  order  their  financial  transactions  by  mail. 
’ For  an  overview  of  the  importance  of  phonebanking,  see  BEUC  (1992)  and  BIS  (1993). 
3 Heffernan  (1992)  computes  the  interest  equivalence  for  a  list  of  nonprice  characteristics  of  bank 
products  but  excludes  the  phone  option. 
4 Henriet  and  Rochet  (1991)  consider  a  similar  framework  to  analyze  competition  in  the  distribution 
of  insurance.  Insurance  intermediaries  are  located  along  the  circle  and  a  direct  writer  is  located  at  the 
center  of  the  circle.  The  cost  to  approach  the  direct  writer  is  uniformly  high  for  all  buyers  of  insurance 
(represented  by  the  length  of  the  radius). 
’  Some  banks  introduced  a  phone  number  per  phone  area.  Therefore,  the  cost  for  a  depositor  to  use 
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Silber  (1983)  offers  an  overview  of  the  process  of  financial  innovations.  His 
main  hypothesis  is  that  “new  financial  practices  are  innovated  to  lessen  the 
financial  constraints  imposed  on  firms’  ’  (p.  89).  Both  external  and  internal 
constraints  are  at  the  origin  of  their  innovative  activity.  This  paper  studies  the 
competitive  effects  of  phonebanking  as  an  option  for  clients  to  execute  their 
financial  transactions  when  banks  are  competitors  in  the  market  for  deposits.  In 
this  way,  innovation  in  the  financial  services  industry  is  the  result  of  strategic 
positioning. 
Matutes  and  Padilla  (1994)  address  the  effect  of  ATM  compatibility  on  banking 
competition  in  the  deposit  market.  They  show  that  either  full  incompatibility  or 
partial  compatibility  occurs.  Full  compatibility  never  constitutes  a  Perfect  Coali- 
tion-Proof  Nash  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies.  A  coalition  of  two  compatible 
banks  vetoes  full  compatibility  since  the  competitive  effects  dominate  the  increase 
in  network  effects.  Phonebanking  however,  contains  no  network  effects,  since  the 
cost  of  exercising  a  transaction  by  phone  is  independent  of  the  number  of  banks 
offering  the  phone  option.  Therefore,  we  do  not  need  more  than  two  banks  for  the 
analysis. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  model. 
Section  3  offers  the  solution  of  the  game  and  interprets  the  results.  Section  4 
concludes. 
2.  A  model  of  spatial  phonebanking  competition  on  the  circle 
Two  banks  A  and  B,  each  consisting  of  a single  branch,  are  located  on  a circle 
with  unit  circumference.  ’  By  convention,  they  are  located  at  distance  l/2  from 
each  other.  ’  (See  Fig.  1.) 
Banks  compete  for  the  deposits  of  individuals  located  along  the  circle.  Compe- 
tition  is  modelled  as  a two-stage  game.  At  stage  one,  banks  simultaneously  decide 
whether  to  offer  their  depositors  the  phone  option  or  not.  The  introduction  of  this 
technology  is  costless  for  both  banks.  We  assume  that  the  processing  cost  for  the 
bank  of  a  transaction  executed  by  phone  or  at  a  branch  is  the  same.  This  cost  is 
normalized  at  zero.  At  stage  two,  given  the  decision  by  the  two  banks  about  stage 
one,  they  simultaneously  set  deposit  rates  ri,  with  i =A,  B.  Deposits  are  invested 
and  generate  a  fixed  return  R  > ri.  ’  The  profit  of  bank  i  is  7rTT,  =  (R  -  r,>y  with 
y  the  amount  of  deposits  attracted. 
’ One  could  think  of  a  town  or  a  district  where  a  bank  opens  only  one  branch. 
‘This  specific  location  setting  will  generate  analogous  conclusions  as  in  a  traditional  Hotelling 
model  where  banks  A  and  B  are  located  at  0  and  1,  respectively. 
s The  paper  takes  the  existence  of  the  banking  firm  as  a  given  and  focuses  only  on  its  liability  side. 232  J.  Bouckaert,  H.  Degryse/European  Economic  Review  39  (1995)  229-244 
Fig.  1. The  circle  model. 
Table  1 
Overview  of  financial  transactions 







Depositors  are  uniformly  distributed  with  density  one  along  the  circle  and 
competition  is  such  that  all  depositors  open  a  deposit  account.  Each  depositor 
invests  on  average  one  normalized  unit  of  money  at  only  one  of  the  two  banks. 
Depositors  exercise  a fixed  number  of  four  different  financial  transactions  (see 
Table  1).  9 
The  first  two  kinds  arise  when  the  depositor  is  at  his  home  location.  We  call 
these  location-specific.  Each  depositor  has  a  well-defined  location  (i.e.  his  home 
location)  and  from  this  point  he  exercises  H  brunch-specific  and  h  non-brunch- 
specific  transactions.  Examples  of  brunch-specific  transactions  are  deposits  or 
withdrawals  of  cash  which  clearly  need  a  visit  to  the  branch.  A  depositor  located 
at  t  visits  its  branch  always  via  the  shortest  arc  length  implying  a  transportation 
cost  k + tz,  with  k > 0  as  the  constant  term  and  t > 0  the  per-unit  distance 
parameter.  An  economic  interpretation  for  k  is  the  average  cost  in  waiting  time 
that  every  depositor  incurs  before  getting  served  at  the  bank  desk.  Examples  of 
non-brunch-specific  transactions  include  provisions,  transfers,  and  payments  which 
do  not  need  a visit  to  the  branch.  If  a bank  offers  its  depositors  the  phone  option, 
two  possibilities  exist  for  the  exercise  of  non-brunch-specific  transactions:  deposi- 
tors  either  phone  their  bank  at  a fixed  cost  r  >  0,  or  visit  their  bank  and  face  the 
above  transportation  cost  k  plus  t  per-unit  distance.  We  will  assume  throughout 
9  We  assume  that  the  number  of  each  type  of  transaction  is  already  the  result  of  an  optimization 
procedure.  Their  fixed  character,  however,  simplifies  calculation. J.  Bouckaert,  H.  Degryse/European  Economic  Review 39  (199.5) 229-244  233 
the  analysis  that  k >  T. This  implies  that  all  depositors  prefer  the  phone  option  for 
the  non-branch-specific  transactions.  lo 
The  other  two  transactions  are  non-location-specific  and  occur  during  travelling 
time.  The  notion  of  non-location-specific  means  that  if a depositor  travels  to some 
point  on  the  circle,  he  can  execute  financial  transactions  from  that  point.  We 
assume  that  the  depositors  arrive  at  some  place  on  the  circle,  according  to  the 
uniform  distribution.  I’ Again,  there  are  branch-specific  and  non-branch-specific 
transactions.  Then,  the  expected  cost  for  M  branch-specific  transactions  equals 
M(k  + t/4),  since  the  expected  distance  to  the  depositor’s  bank  is  l/4.  The 
expected  cost  for  rn  non-branch-specific  transactions  in  case  no  phone  option  is 
available,  is  obtained  in  a  similar  fashion.  If  the  phone  option  is  available.  all 
depositors  prefer  it,  since  k > 7. 
If  x  is  bank  A’s  market  share,  the  depositor  who  is  indifferent  between  two 
non-phonebanks  A  and  B  is  located  at  x/2  such  that 
r.4 -P+h)(  )  kft;  -(M+m)  k+; 
(  ) 
=r  ,-(H+h)  k+t 
( 
y)  -(M+m)(k+;). 
In  Eq.  (11,  the  non-location-specific  transactions  cancel  out.  In  other  words, 
banks  are  perfect  substitutes  for  these  transactions. 
The  depositor  who  is  indifferent  between  phonebank  A  and  non-phonebank  B 
is  located  at  x/2  such  that 
rA -H(k+ti)  -hT--M(k+  i)  -mm7 
=r  ,-(H+h)  ktr 
( 
q)  -(M+m)(k+;). 
In  Eq.  (2)  m-transactions  do  not  longer  cancel  out.  In  addition,  the  non- 
branch-specific  transactions  imply  a  lower  cost  at  the  phonebank.  These  differ- 
ences  in  transaction  costs  have  an  impact  on  the  marginal  depositor. 
The  depositor  who  is  indifferent  between  two  phonebanks  A  and  B  is  located 
at  .x/2  such  that 
rA-H(k+t:)  -hT-M(k+i)  -mm7 
=r  A-H  k+t(l-x) 
( 
-)  -hr-Mjk+  +)  -m,r.  (3) 
“’ In  other  words,  offering  the  phone  option  is  a  quality  improvement.  In  case  k < 7,  best-response 
functions  become  kinked  and  discontinuous  such  that  the  existence  of  a  Subgame  Perfect  Nash 
Equilibrium  (SPNE)  in  pure  strategies  is  not  ensured. 
”  Matutes  and  Padilla  (1994)  introduce  similar  transactions;  in  their  model,  depositors  need  cash 
unexpectedly  when  ‘travelling’  around  the  city. 234  J.  Bouckaert,  H. Degryse  /  European  Economic  Review 39  (1995)  229-244 
The  terms  concerning  h-,  m-  and  M-transactions  disappear.  Their  fixed  cost 
character  explains  this  result.  The  market  shares  x  and  1 -x  between  two 
phonebanks  are  determined  by  the  deposit  rates  and  the  H-transactions. 
Some  additional  notation  is  introduced  before  moving  to  the  following  section. 
Denote  by  Pi  phonebank  i  and  by  N,  non-phonebank  i. 
3.  Solution  of the game 
We  solve  the  game  for  its  Subgame  Perfect  Nash  Equilibria  in  pure  strategies 
by  the  method  of  backward  induction.  Subsection  3.1  focuses  on  the  equilibria  for 
the  game  in  stage  two,  given  the  decisions  by  the  two  banks  taken  in  the  first 
stage.  The  SPNE  for  the  two-stage  game  are  presented  in  Subsection  3.2. 
3.1.  Second  stage  competition:  The  choice  of  interest  rates 
There  are  three  subgames  I2  to  be  considered:  two  non-phonebanks  ( NA, NB) 
(Subsection  3.1.1),  one  phonebank  only  (P,,  N,)  (Subsection  3.1.2)  and  two 
phonebanks  (P,,  P,)  (Subsection  3.1.3).  In  order  to  derive  a  Nash  equilibrium  in 
deposit  rates  for  each  subgame,  we  compute  the  best  response  functions  for  both 
banks,  taking  into  account  that  the  behavior  of  the  indifferent  depositor  determines 
their  market  share.  Section  3.1.4  interprets  the  results  within  and  across  subgames. 
3.1.1.  Subgame  (N,,  NB) 
This  subgame  is  comparable  to  a well-known  model  of  product  differentiation 
on  the  circle  with  linear  transportation  costs,  since  every  depositor  has  to  execute 
all  transactions  at  the  branch  of  his  bank.  From  (l),  bank  A’s  market  share  is 
t(H+h) 
.  2  (4) 
Substituting  (4)  into  bank  A’s  profit  function,  we  obtain  its  best  response  function: 
t(H+h) 
2  (5) 
In  a similar  way,  one  finds  the  best  response  function  for  bank  B.  In  equilibrium, 
each  bank  captures  half  of  the  market,  charges  the  same  deposit  rate  ri  ( NA, Ns) 
=  ri  (N,,  NB)  =  R  -  t  (H  +  h)/2  and  obtains  as  profit 
t(H+h) 
12  The  same  results  apply  for  the  cases  where  bank  B  is  the  first  element  in  the  tuple. J.  Bouckaert,  H.  Degryse  /  European  Economic  ReGew 39  (I 995)  229-244  2.15 
Table  2 
Comparative  statics  for  the  (N,,  Ns)  case 
I  7, 
I  x, 













M  m  k-r 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
Eq.  (6)  contains  only  location-specific  transactions.  The  m-  and  M-transactions 
disappear  because  of  a Bertrand  result:  banks  are  not  differentiated  with  respect  to 
these  non-location-specific  transactions. 
Comparative  statics  for  the  (N’,  Ns)  case  are  shown  in  Table  2.  An  increase  in 
t  enhances  both  banks’  monopoly  power,  generating  lower  deposit  rates  and 
higher  profits.  Both  types  of  location-specific  transactions  reduce  the  equilibrium 
deposit  rate  and  increase  profits.  Changes  in  exogenous  variables  do  not  affect  the 
equilibrium  market  share.  The  M-transactions  and  the  difference  k -  7  do  not 
influence  the  equilibrium  deposit  rate,  market  share  and  profits. 
3.1.2.  Subgame  (PA, Ns) 
In  the  second  subgame,  only  one  bank  offers  the  phone  option.  From  Eq.  (2) 
bank  A’s  market  share  is 
r,+h(k---7)+m[k--T+ij+  ‘(Hl’)).  (7) 





Substituting  Eq.  (7)  into  bank  B’s  profit  function,  its  best-response  function 
becomes 
1 
2  ! 
tH 
r B=-  rA -T+h(k-r)+m(k-i+;j+H). 
From  Eqs.  (8)  and  (9)  the  equilibrium  deposit  rates  for  this  subgame  are: 
t(H+h)  h 
ri(P4,NB)  =R-  2  -3(k-T)+;-;(k-r+;j  (IO) 
and 
rg*(PA,  N,)  =R- 
t(H+h) 
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The  corresponding  equilibrium  market  shares  are: 
and 
2 
x;(p,,&)  = 
t(3H  +  h) 
t(2H  +  h)  6 
-+-;(k--i+$))_ 
(13) 




r;(P,,N,)  = 
t(3H  +  h) 
t(2H  +  h)  6 
In  this  subgame,  banks  are  clearly  differentiated  with  respect  to  the  m-,  h-  and 
H-transactions.  As  a  consequence,  these  transactions  enter  into  the  profit  func- 
tions. 
Comparative  statics  for  the  (PA,  Ns)  case  are  summarized  in  Table  3.  Higher 
transportation  costs  reduce  both  banks’  deposit  rates.  However,  they  affect  the 
(non-)  phonebank’s  market  share  in  a  (positive)  negative  way.  The  overall  effect 
on  profits  is  positive  for  both  banks.  Location-specific  transactions  increase  the 
intermediation  rate  for  both  banks.  The  H-transactions  reduce  the  phonebank’s 
Table  3 
Comparative  statics  for  the  ( PA, Ns 1 case 
I  H  iI  M  m  k--7 
_  -  _  0  _  _ 
_  _  _  0  +  + 
_  _  ?  0  +  + 
+  +  ?  0  _  _ 
+  +  ?  0  +  + 
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market  share  to  the  advantage  of  the  non-phonebank  and  decrease  the  gains  from 
differentiation.  The  effect  of  h-transactions  on  the  deposit  rate  is  negative,  while 
the  effect  on  market  share  and  profits  is  ambiguous.  The  m-transactions  and  the 
difference  in  fixed  costs  k -  T  reduce  (increase)  the  (non-Iphonebank’s  deposit 
rate  and  increase  (reduce)  market  share.  They  both  unambiguously  enhance 
(reduce)  the  profits  of  the  (non-)  phonebank. 
3.1.3.  Subgame  (PA, P,) 
From  Eq.  (31,  bank  A’s  market  share  is 
(16) 
Substituting  Eq.  (16)  into  bank  A’s  profit  function,  we  can  derive  its  best  response 
function: 
I  tH 
r,=-  rs 




Bank  B’s  best-response  function  is  similarly  derived.  In  equilibrium,  each  bank 
captures  half  of  the  market  and  offers  as  deposit  rate 
r;(~~,P,)=rd(PI,P,)=R-~.  ( 18) 
The  equilibrium  profits  are 
(19) 
Eq.  (19)  shows  that  the  h-transactions  do  not  enter  the  profit  function  for  the  same 
reason  as  the  m-  and  M-transactions  in  Eq.  (6).  Banks  are  not  differentiated  with 
respect  to  the  h-transactions,  and  price  competition  cannot  be  relaxed.  Conse- 
quently,  a  Bertrand  result  appears. 
Comparative  statics  are  summarized  in  Table  4  and  are  similar  to  the  (N,,  N,) 
case  except  for  the  h-transactions. 
3.1.4.  Interpretation 
Before  moving  to  the  first  stage,  some  comparisons  can  be  made  about  the 
deposit  rates  and  market  shares  within  and  across  the  different  subgames.  First, 
Table  4 
Comparative  statics  for  the  (PA, Ps)  case 
* 
rz I  x, 









h  M 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
m  k-r 
0  0 
0  0 
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ri  (I’,,  Ns)  can  either  be  larger  or  smaller  than  ri  (N,,  NB).  This  ambiguity  stems 
from  two  reasons.  The  first  is  that  in  the  (I’,,  Ns)  case  more  differentiation  is 
introduced  uis-&uis  the  (N,,  Ns)  case:  all  depositors  strictly  prefer  the  phone 
option  for  their  m-  and  h-transactions  being  offered  at  bank  A  only.  This  results 
in  a reduction  of  A’s  deposit  rate  as  shown  by  the  third  and  fifth  term  in  Eq.  (10). 
The  same  reasoning  explains  the  opposite  observation  in  Eq.  (11)  for  bank  B’s 
deposit  rate.  The  other  reason  is that  less  differentiation  results  in  banks  competing 
more  strenuously  for  the  same  depositors:  neighboring  depositors  become  less 
captive,  resulting  in  a  reduction  of  their  monopoly  power.  The  fourth  component 
in  Eqs.  (10)  and  (11)  illustrates  this  effect.  Adding  up  both  effects  generates  the 
above  ambiguity  for  bank  A.  For  bank  B,  however,  no  ambiguity  results,  since 
ri  (I’,,  Ns)  >  ri  (N,,  Ns).  The  non-phonebank  increases  its  deposit  rate  on  de- 
posits  in  order  not  to  be  driven  out  of  the  market. 
Second,  ri  (P,,  N,)  > ri  (P,,  NB).  Bank  A  is  differentiated  from  B  and  can 
use  its  monopoly  power  to  charge  a lower  deposit  rate. 
Third,  ri  (P,,  N,)  < ri  (P,,  PB).  When  both  banks  introduce  the  phone  option, 
they  are  not  differentiated  with  respect  to  their  m-  and  h-transactions:  a Bertrand 
result  holds  for  these  transactions.  If bank  B  does  not  offer  the  phone  option,  more 
differentiation  results.  Depositors  prefer  bank  A  in  order  to  execute  their  m-  and 
h-transactions.  Therefore,  they  become  more  captive  uis&lis  the  situation  where 
both  banks  offer  the  phone  option.  This  results  in  a  lower  deposit  rate.  The  same 
reasoning  explains  why  ri  (PA,  Ns)  can  either  be  larger  or  smaller  than 
rB*  <P,,  PB). 
Fourth,  ri* (N,,  NB)  < ri* (P,,  P,),  with  i = A,  B.  Both  banks  are  differentiated 
with  respect  to their  h-transactions  when  both  banks  do  not  offer  the  phone  option. 
This  is  not  the  case  if  both  banks  offer  the  phone  option.  The  introduction  of  the 
phone  option  unambiguously  steps  up  competition  between  banks,  yielding  a 
higher  deposit  rate. 
Fifth,  X; (PA,  NB)  > xi  (PA,  Ns).  The  phonebank  clearly  attracts  a  higher  mar- 
ket  share  uis-h-uis  the  subgames  ( NA, N,)  and  (PA,  PB).  Two  effects  can  be 
distinguished  in  case  bank  A  deviates  from  the  (N,,  NB)  towards  the  (PA, NB) 
case.  I3 One  is  the  demand  e#ect  (the  direct  effect)  through  a  change  in  market 
share  given  B’s  equilibrium  deposit  rate  of  the  (N,,  NB) case.  This  change  equals 
2 
=  t(2H+h)  4  ( 
th 
--+h(k-?)+++fi)>o  (20) 
and  is  positive  since  depositors  strictly  prefer  to  execute  their  m-and  h-  transac- 
tions  by  phone.  The  direct  effect  on  profits  is positive,  since  bank  A’s  deposit  rate 
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decreases.  The  other  is  the  strategic  effect  (the  indirect  effect)  and  captures  the 
impact  on  A’s  (the  phonebank’s)  profits  through  the  change  in  B’s  (the  non- 
phonebank’s)  deposit  rate.  The  effect  on  market  share  is  negative  and  equals 
2 
=  r(2H  +  h)  i 
--  ~-~(K-++tf))<O.  (21) 
The  change  in  deposit  rate  is  positive,  resulting  in  a  negative  strategic  effect  on 
profits.  Adding  up  Eqs.  (20)  and  (21),  the  total  change  in  terms  of  market  share 
becomes  positive:  a phonebank  competing  with  a non-phonebank  attracts  a higher 
market  share.  The  total  effect  on  profits,  however,  is  ambiguous. 
Sixth,  a simple  welfare  analysis  shows  that  depositors  are  best  off  if both  banks 
offer  the  phone  option.  The  introduction  of the  phone  option  by  only  one  bank  also 
increases  the  welfare  of  the  depositors.  Both  increases  in  welfare  result  from  a 
combination  of  the  competitive  effects  between  banks  and  the  decrease  in  trans- 
portation  costs.  The  depositors  strictly  prefer  ( ed,  PR)  to (P,,  NB) and  (c,,,  NR) to 
(N,,  N,). 
Finally,  using  the  terminology  of  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  (1984),  banks  act  as 
puppy  dogs  in  their  decision  to  offer  the  phone  option.  According  to  the  above 
analysis,  that  decision  negatively  (positively)  influences  the  opponent’s  market 
share  (deposit  rate),  irrespective  of  his  first  stage  decision.  Due  to  the  negative 
effect  on  the  opponent’s  profit,  offering  the  phone  is  a tough  strategy.  Since  price 
competition  yields  strategic  complements,  the  puppy  dog  strategy  follows.  As  a 
result,  banks  show  a  tendency  towards  underimlestrnent  in  the  phone  technology. 
3.2.  First  stage  competition:  Phone  option  decision 
In  the  first  stage  of  the  game,  the  two  banks  simultaneously  choose  whether  to 
introduce  the  phone  option  or  not.  They  do  so  knowing  that  in  the  second  stage 
they  will  compete  in  deposit  rates  as  described  in  Subsection  3.1. 
From  Eqs.  (11, (2)  and  (31,  M-transactions  do  not  affect  the  marginal  depositor. 
Therefore,  M  equals  zero  without  loss  of  generality.  In  what  follows,  we  normal- 
ize  h + H  + m  =  1.  Then,  m  measures  the  percentage  of  non-location-specific 
transactions.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  assume  H  = ah.  so  that  h = (1  -  m)/(l 
+  cu) and  m  E  [O, I]. 
The  following  proposition  characterizes  all  possible  SPNE  in  pure  strategies  for 
the  overall  game. 
Proposition.  Let  H  =  (Y  h > 0,  h + H  + m  =  I, 
fJ(t)=l- 
(4(k-7)+t)((Y+l) 
3t{2(a+l)(2Lu+  1)  +fY(4(k-7)  -5t)  -3t 240 
and 
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Z(t)  =  l- 
(4(k-7)  +t)(a+1) 
-3t@qzzTj  + (w(4(k-  T)  + 7t)  + 3t. 
(a)  I” m E [0, _m(  t)], then no bank  introduces  the phone  option  (region  I>. 
(b)  Zf m E [z(t),  E(t)],  then  only  one  bank  introduces  the  phone  option 
(region  II). 
(c)  Zf m E [E(t),  l),  then both banks  introduce  the phone  option  (region  III). 
Proof.  Straightforward  calculations  show  that  ~~~ (Pi,  JIj)  Q ni* (Ni,  Nj)  if  and 
only  if  m G G(t)  and  nj* (Pi,  Pi> G  rj*  (Pi,  Arj) if  and  only  if  m < E(t),  i Z j  and 
for  all  i, j E {A, B].  Notice  that  g(t)  < iii(t). 
(a)  For  m <  E(t),  we  have  that  ~~~  (Pi,  Nj> Q mi* (iVi, Nj)  and  rj*  (Pi,  Pi)  < 
nj* (Pi,  Nj> hold,  resulting  in  (N,,  ZVs) as  the  unique  SPNE. 
(b)  For  E(t)  G m < E(t),  we  have  that  ri*(Pi,  Nj> 2  rri*(Ni,  Nj)  and 
nj*(Pi,  Pi> G  ~ri*(P,,  IVj.>  hold.  This  results  in  (PA,  Ns)  and  (N,,  PB)  as  the  two 
SPNE. 
(c>  For  G&t> Q m,  we  have  that  nj*(Pi,  Pi> >  nj*(P,,  Arj> and  ri*(Pi,  ~j>  > 
rri* (Ni,  Nj> hold,  resulting  in  (PA,  PB)  as  the  unique  SPNE.  0 
Fig.  2 illustrates  the  Proposition  for  given  values  of  (Y, T and  k. We  depict  t on 
the  horizontal  and  m  on  the  vertical  axis.  The  functions  _m(t) and  Z(t)  represent 
m  1  H=0.3h,tau=l.l,k=l 
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Fig.  2.  The  phone  option  decision. 
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the  borderlines  between  regions  I  and  II,  II  and  III,  respectively.  From  the 
normalization,  the  size  of  the  regions  is  a  measure  for  their  relative  importance. 
The  equilibrium  outcome  depends  on  the  relative  strength  of  the  demand  and 
strategic  effect.  Region  I  describes  the  parameter  constellations  for  an  equilibrium 
with  IZO  phonebanking.  Introducing  the  phone  option  in  that  region  implies  a 
strategic  effect  outweighing  the  demand  effect.  Thus,  although  offering  the  phone 
option  yields  a higher  market  share,  the  percentage  of  m-transactions  is  too  low  to 
compensate  for  the  encouraged  competition.  The  higher  their  percentage,  however, 
the  more  a depositor  values  a phonebank. 
Region  II  satisfies  the  parameter  constellations  for  specialization:  only  one 
bank  offers  the  phone  option.  Specialization  occurs  whenever  transportation  costs 
are  sufficiently  high  and  m  has  intermediate  values.  Here,  offering  the  phone 
option  implies  a demand  effect  dominating  the  strategic  effect.  Only  in  this  region, 
the  depositors’  value  for  the  phone  option  affects  the  marginal  depositor.  The 
phonebank  appropriates  part  of  its  depositors’  value  for  the  phone  option.  There- 
fore,  it  enjoys  a  lower  deposit  rate  and  a  larger  market  share  compared  to  the 
non-phonebank.  The  latter  does  not  offer  the  phone  option,  as  it  induces  two 
effects.  First,  the  percentage  of  m-transactions  would  not  affect  the  marginal 
depositor’s  choice  of  bank  anymore.  Second,  it  would  result  in  a  lower  degree  of 
horizontal  differentiation,  enhancing  competition.  Adding  up,  the  strategic  effect 
overwhelms  the  demand  effect.  It  is  clear  that  a coordination  problem  arises  with 
respect  to  who  will  become  the  phonebank.  A  sequential  game  where  nature 
decides  who  moves  first,  could  solve  this  problem. 
Region  III  contains  the  parameter  constellations  where  universal  phonebanking 
takes  place.  Each  bank  individually  decides  to  offer  the  phone  option:  the  demand 
effect  always  dominates  the  strategic  effect.  Remark  that  (N+,, NB)  as  well  as 
(PA,  PR)  are  standard  models  of  product  differentiation,  the  latter  having  lower 
costs  of  transportation.  Therefore,  in  region  III  a  Prisoner’s  dilemma  situation 
occurs.  Although  not  introducing  the  phone  option  would  be  more  profitable  for 
both  banks,  each  bank  individually  decides  to  offer  the  phone  option. 
The  borderline  z(t)  is  upward-sloping  and  concave.  The  slope  can  be  ex- 
plained  from  Eqs.  (6)  and  (14),  where  &rA*  ( NA, NR)/at  >  i)?c  ( cd,  N,  )/at  for 
any  (m,  t)  satisfying  g(t).  For  a  given  m,  the  strategic  effect  increases  with  I, 
whereas  the  demand  effect  is  decreasing.  An  increase  in  the  m-transactions 
countervails  these  two  effects.  That  is,  along  this  borderline,  a  bank  needs  more 
m-transactions  when  offering  the  phone  as  t  increases.  Concavity  results  from 
a’~~* (PA,  N,)/am’  >  0.  In  a  similar  way,  one  can  explain  the  upward-sloping 
concave  borderline  K(t)  separating  regions  II  and  Ill. 
The  demand  effect  becomes  more  important  when  the  cost  difference  k -  T 
increases.  In  other  words,  the  size  of  region  III  (universal  phonebanking)  in- 
creases.  The  opposite  holds  for  region  I  (no  phonebanking).  The  size  of  regions  I, 
II  and  III  depends  upon  the  underimlestment  effect.  The  puppy  dog  strategy 
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Two  special  cases  remain.  First,  if  m =  1, (P,,  N,),  (N,,  PSI  and  (P,,  Pa>  are 
SPNE.  The  second-stage  equilibrium  in  both  the  (P,,  Pa)  and  (N,,  NB)  case  is 
setting  ri =  R.  In  cases  (P,,,  N,)  or  (N,,  P,),  the  phonebank’s  optimal  deposit  rate 
drives  its  non-phone  competitor  out  of  the  market.  (N,,  Ns)  cannot  be  a  SPNE, 
since  one  bank  always  makes  strictly  positive  profits  by  offering  the  phone  option. 
Then,  the  non-phonebank  cannot  strictly  increase  its  profits  with  also  offering  the 
phone  option.  The  same  reasoning  applies  to  the  (PA, P,)  equilibrium.  Each  SPNE 
enables  all  depositors  to  make  use  of  the  phone  option.  However,  all  gains  from 
the  phone  technology  are  captured  by  depositors  when  both  banks  offer  the  phone 
option.  Second,  if  (Y  =  0,  the  results  for  regions  1 and  II  of  Fig.  2  remain  intact. 
Region  III,  however,  shows  three  SPNE:  (PA, P,),  (PA, NB) and  (N,,  PB). If  both 
banks  offer  the  phone  option,  they  set  deposit  rates  equal  to  R  and  realize  zero 
profits.  If  only  one  bank  offers  the  phone  option,  its  optimal  deposit  rate  is  such 
that  the  non-phonebank  is  driven  out  of  the  market.  It  follows  then  that  (PA, P,), 
(PA, N,)  and  ( NA, PB) are  SPNE  for  region  III. 
3.3.  Collusion, fees,  and multiproduct  banks 
Assume  banks  can  collude  in  the  second  stage  by  signing  some  binding 
agreement.  I4 Then  universal  phonebanking  will  result.  Offering  the  phone  option 
induces  only  a  demand  effect.  Banks  fully  appropriate  the  marginal  depositor’s 
decrease  in  travelling  costs  per  depositor.  Alternatively,  any  deposit  rate  fixed  by 
government,  encourages  universal  phonebanking. 
Introducing  more  complicated  contracts  in  this  model  will  not  necessarily  alter 
our  results.  Take  the  case  of  a  fee  per  (type  of)  transaction  and  a  deposit  rate.  In 
practice,  some  banks  charge  a  fee  for  phonebanking.  In  our  model,  however,  a 
higher  deposit  rate  will  fully  compensate  this  fee.  The  fee  per  (type  of)  transaction 
acts  as  a perfect  substitute  for  the  deposit  rate,  since  the  number  of  transactions  is 
fixed.  Deposit  rate  and  fees,  however,  are  no  longer  perfect  substitutes  if  the 
number  of  transactions  is  endogenous.  Also,  spatial  discrimination  is  not  an 
alternative.  Depositors  can  circumvent  this  by  making  an  agreement  with  someone 
living  closer  to  the  bank. 
Suppose  a phonebank  offers  its  depositors  the  choice  between  two  products.  In 
contrast  to  the  first  product,  the  second  allows  the  depositor  to  use  the  phone 
option.  With  each  product,  the  bank  associates  a  deposit  rate.  Nearby  depositors 
are  most  willing  to  buy  product  one  if  its  associated  deposit  rate  is  sufficiently 
higher.  Note  that  these  two  products  do  not  affect  the  location  of  the  marginal 
depositor  between  banks.  Therefore,  the  multiproduct  phonebank  can  not  improve 
on  profits.  In  other  words,  it  is  optimal  for  banks  to  practice  ‘pure  bundling’.  I5 
Heterogeneity  in  the  number  of  depositors’  transactions  would  allow  banks  better 
I4 See  Fershtman  and  Gandal  (1994). 
l5 This  stems  with  the  statement  that  ‘a  bank  offers  an  indivisible  array  of  services’  (see  Tirole  (1988, 
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to  discriminate  among  depositors,  Differentiation  between  firms,  however,  seems 
to  be  more  important  for  profitability  than  the  possibility  of  discrimination  (see 
Champsaur  and  Rochet,  1990). 
4.  Concluding  remarks 
We  investigated  the  effects  of phonebanking  upon  competition  in  the  market  for 
deposits.  Our  model  shows  that  diverse  equilibria  occur.  Two  opposite  effects  are 
responsible  for  this  diversity.  First,  the  phone  option  reduces  depositors’  transac- 
tion  costs.  This  creates  a demand  effect.  Second,  it encourages  competition  among 
banks  through  these  lower  transaction  costs.  This  is  the  strategic  effect.  There  is 
no  phonebanking  if  the  strategic  effect  dominates.  Specialization  appears  for  a 
relatively  large  demand  effect  and  a  moderate  strategic  effect.  Universal 
phonebanking  emerges  if  the  demand  effect  overwhelms  the  strategic  effect.  The 
latter  leads  to  tougher  competition  compared  to  no  phonebanking.  The  competitive 
effects  result  in  a tendency  to  underinvest  in  the  phone  technology.  Depositors  are 
best  off  with  universal  phonebanking. 
We  conclude  with  three  possible  extensions.  First,  if the  phone  option  implies  a 
reduction  in  processing  costs,  its  attractiveness  for  banks  increases.  The  competi- 
tive  effects,  however,  remain.  Second,  one  could  make  the  number  of  financial 
transactions  endogenous,  following  the  Baumol-Tobin  tradition  (see  Barro  and 
Santomero,  1972;  Santomero,  1979).  One  expects  the  average  outstanding  amount 
of  deposits  to  be  higher  in  case  a of  a  phonebank.  Therefore,  the  attractiveness  of 
offering  the  phone  option  increases.  Third,  our  results  also  remain  valid  in  a 
slightly  different  model  with  some  depositor  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  the  number 
of  transactions.  Price  competition  is  relaxed  in  the  ( P4, N,)  case.  However,  price 
competition  is  enhanced  in  the  cc,,,  PR) case. 
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